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INTRODUCTION 
That controversial decisions by the United States Supreme Court can spur 
dissenting citizens to action is, by now, a familiar idea.  The primary recent 
example remains the intense and sustained efforts to prohibit or substantially 
restrict access to legal abortion spurred by Roe v. Wade,1 in which the Court 
recognized a woman’s right to decide whether or not to continue her 
pregnancy.2  Conversely, the Court’s failure to recognize a constitutional right 
– for example, its controversial five-to-four Bowers v. Hardwick holding that 
the constitutional right of privacy did not extend to private, consensual conduct 
by homosexuals3 – may provoke citizens to seek social change and to turn to 
other fora, such as state and federal legislatures or state courts.4 
 
∗ Professor of Law and Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar, Boston University School of 
Law.  This Essay expands on my remarks delivered as a participant of the panel, “Beyond 
Legislatures: Social Movements, Social Change, and the Possibilities of Demosprudence,” 
at the symposium, “The Most Disparaged Branch: The Role of Congress in the 21st 
Century,” held at Boston University School of Law, November 14-15, 2008.  Thanks to 
Lani Guinier for her catalytic work and to my other co-panelists, Fred Harris, Robert Post, 
and Gerald Rosenberg, for their stimulating engagement with that work.  This Essay 
benefitted from that discussion.  Thanks also to my research assistant, Jennifer Dixon, and 
to Boston University Head of Reference Services at Pappas Law Library, Stefanie 
Weigmann, for valuable research assistance. 
1 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
2 Id. at 153. 
3 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003). 
4 For a history of such post-Hardwick efforts, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., 
DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA, 1861-2003, at 250-52, 269-98 
(2008). 
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In a recent article, Professor Lani Guinier takes up an intriguing variation on 
this idea, asserting that dissenting justices, both through written, but 
particularly through oral, dissents, may spur “ordinary people” to action.5  In 
stressing the role of dissents in expanding the range of democratic action, 
Guinier is not merely reiterating the point that well-written dissenting opinions 
serve important functions because they may provide the foundation for 
majority opinions “twenty years from now,” or “broaden the jurisprudential 
range . . . of the next generation of law students” by capturing their 
imaginations.6  Rather, in stressing that “Justices teach by their opinions,”7 she 
contends that “[i]n a contemporary context, . . . dissenting Justices may 
educate, inspire, and mobilize citizens to serve the present as well as the future 
goals of our democracy.”8  Guinier offers concrete examples in which oral 
dissents apparently mobilized citizens and lent authority to their efforts at 
social change and law reform:9 Justice Breyer’s oral dissent from the Court’s 
holding striking down Seattle’s and Louisville’s voluntary school integration 
plans in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 
1,10 and Justice Ginsburg’s oral dissent from the Court’s narrow reading of the 
statute of limitations for filing a sex discrimination claim under Title VII in 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.11  Observing that this tool is not the 
sole province of one “side” of the Court, Guinier contends that a particularly 
talented dissenter is Justice Scalia, who self-consciously uses both his oral and 
written dissents as a means of “advocating for the future . . . for the next 
generation and for law students.”12  Guinier (along with Gerald Torres, her co-
author elsewhere) coins the term “demosprudence” to refer to “lawmaking or 
 
5 See Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term – Foreword: Demosprudence 
Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 12 (2008). 
6 Id. at 14.  Of course, judicial dissents may play this foundational role outside the 
context of federal constitutional law as well.  See, e.g., KIMBERLY D. RICHMAN, COURTING 
CHANGE: QUEER PARENTS, JUDGES, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN FAMILY LAW 
123-151 (2009) (arguing that dissents by state court judges in family law cases have played 
a foreshadowing and catalytic role in instructing lawyers about how to craft future legal 
challenges and in paving the way for later majority opinions recognizing the parental rights 
of gay men and lesbians). 
7 Guinier, supra note 5, at 14.  In describing demosprudential dissenters “at their best,” 
as “teachers in a vital national seminar,” Guiner draws on scholarship concerning the 
educative role of Supreme Court opinions.  Id. at 49 (quoting Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is 
the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 961, 962 (1992)). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 6-13, 35-45. 
10 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007). 
11 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.  
12 Guinier, supra note 5, at 45 (quoting Posting of Dan Slater to WSJ Law Blog, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/05/30/law-blog-chats-with-scalia-part-ii-master-of-the-
dissent/ (May 30, 2008, 21:04 EST)). 
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legal practices that inform and are informed by the wisdom of the people.”13  
Because dissents have “democracy-enhancing potential,”14 she urges the 
Supreme Court to “see beyond academics to the people themselves as a source 
of democratic authority and accountability.”15 
In this Essay, I will offer three observations about Professor Guinier’s 
intriguing project of encouraging the use of dissent to catalyze democratic 
action.  First, I examine the connection that Guinier sees between a dissenting 
Justice’s life experience and his or her capacity to be moved by a litigant’s 
plight.16  I look back to Lynne Henderson’s exploration, more than twenty 
years ago, of empathy’s role in shaping Justices’ opinions.17  Second, I discuss 
the emphasis on life experience and the capacity for empathy in President 
Obama’s public statements about judicial qualifications, criticized by some for 
stressing empathy to the detriment of justice and the rule of law.18  Third, I 
contrast Guinier’s call for Supreme Court Justices to be more mindful of the 
democratic potential of their dissents with political scientist Rogers Smith’s 
proposal that judicial rulings, particularly those by the Supreme Court, can 
further social transformation by “usefully highlight[ing] the way existing 
arrangements appear to be working against constitutional goals and values,” 
and identifying “the most important tasks of civic restructuring that confront 
the rest of us.”19  Smith’s comparative modesty about the institutional capacity 
of courts to bring about needed social transformation offers an instructive 
contrast to Guinier’s aspirations for dissenters.20 
I. REVISITING THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY AND EMPATHY 
What moves a Supreme Court Justice to issue an oral dissent?  This question 
spurs further questions, including one to which numerous academics, jurists, 
and politicians have offered answers: what qualities are foundational for good 
 
13 Id. at 15.  Guinier and Torres expound this idea of “demosprudence” in their 
forthcoming book, LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, CHANGING THE WIND: THE 
DEMOSPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (forthcoming 2010). 
14 Guinier, supra note 5, at 15. 
15 Id. at 131. 
16 Id. at 32-45 (examining the biographies of Justices Thurgood Marshall, Stephen 
Breyer, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg in relation to their most memorable dissents). 
17 Lynne Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1576 (1987) 
(arguing that “empathy enables the decisionmaker to have an appreciation of the human 
meanings of a given legal situation”). 
18 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Obama’s ‘Redistribution’ Constitution, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 28, 2008, at A17 (criticizing then-Senator Obama’s remarks about looking at a judge’s 
empathy when deciding judicial appointments). 
19 Rogers M. Smith, Gender at the Margins of Contemporary Constitutional Citizenship, 
in GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN’S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP (Linda C. McClain & 
Joanna L. Grossman eds., forthcoming Oct. 2009) (manuscript at 5, on file with author). 
20 Id. (manuscript at 4). 
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judging?21  Professor Guinier proposes that something in the biography of 
particular Justices leads them to identify with the losing litigant and with the 
constituencies who will bear the impact of the majority’s opinion and to speak 
directly to those people in their oral dissents.22  For example, Justice Breyer, 
who issued an oral dissent in Parents Involved, “taught administrative law, and 
his father was the lawyer for the Superintendents of Schools in San 
Francisco.”23  She posits that his dissent is “speaking to school boards” and 
that his “experience” connects him to those school board members whose 
efforts were halted by the majority’s ruling.24  Guinier contends that Breyer 
exhorts school board members to keep trying, telling them: “[D]o not feel 
paralyzed by the majority because the law is on your side and the Court is 
acting as a renegade.”25  Indeed, she argues that Pat Todd, a Louisville school 
board member, took Justice Breyer’s exhortation “seriously,” persisting in her 
endeavors by always reading his dissent at the beginning of her public 
presentations around the county.26 
Guinier argues that biography is also relevant to understanding Justice 
Ginsburg’s impassioned oral dissent in Ledbetter, in which Ginsburg spoke 
directly to working women whose pay discrimination claims would be barred 
by the Court’s ruling (using the formulation “you”), and to Congress, urging it 
to correct the Court’s ruling.27  Ginsburg’s role as a pioneer of the litigation 
strategy that led to key equal protection rulings by the Court in the 1970s is a 
relevant biographical fact that might have moved Ginsburg to speak to the 
female workers suffering pay inequity.28  Guinier suggests that Ginsburg also 
“found her own voice,” and had a “transformational moment” in issuing the 
oral dissent, helping to convert Lilly Ledbetter’s loss into a “legislative 
crusade” to change the law.29  This dissent expressed Ginsburg’s belief that 
“legislative and political strategies for reform are more sustainable” than 
 
21 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for 
Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1943 (1988) (arguing for a “revision of the conception 
of the task of judging”). 
22 See Guinier, supra note 5, at 32 (suggesting that Justice Thurgood Marshall’s “most 
memorable dissents came in the areas in which he was most influential as an advocate”).   
23 Id. at 37. 
24 Id. (“That Justice Breyer is speaking to school boards, rather than directly to the 
people . . . suggests a distinctive avenue for democratic engagement.”). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 38. 
27 Id. at 39 (“Often relying on the personal pronoun, Justice Ginsburg spoke directly to 
‘you’ – the women who had been paid less but had no redress.”). 
28 Id. at 38-39; see, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, “The Way Women Are”: Some Notes in the 
Margin for Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 619, 619 (1998) (describing Justice 
Ginsburg’s role as an advocate for “equal treatment” under the law). 
29 Guinier, supra note 5, at 40. 
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judicial rulings.30  Guinier argues that Ginsburg also modeled, for working 
women, how to participate in the public sphere and “helped authorize women 
to push back on the dominant norms of the Court’s conservative majority and 
to elaborate their own stories.”31 
Guinier’s attending to the ways in which their biographies may have led 
Supreme Court Justices to reach out to litigants and to ordinary citizens brings 
to mind work done some years ago concerning the relationship between 
legality and empathy, or how a judge’s capacity for empathy may shape his or 
her ruling.32  In her article, Legality and Empathy, Lynne Henderson began by 
quoting Justice Thurgood Marshall: “It is perfectly proper for judges to 
disagree about what the Constitution requires.  But it is disgraceful for an 
interpretation of the Constitution to be premised upon unfounded assumptions 
about how people live.”33 
Henderson’s project challenges the assumption that “legality,” or “the 
dominant belief system about the Rule and role of Law,” and “empathy,” are 
“mutually exclusive concepts,” such that emotion and feeling should be kept 
separate from the work of judges.34  Empathy, she writes, entails: “(1) feeling 
the emotion of another; (2) understanding the experience or situation of 
another, . . . often achieved by imagining oneself to be in the position of the 
other; and (3) action brought about by experiencing the distress of another”; 
the first two elements are “ways of knowing,” while the third is a “catalyst for 
action.”35  Henderson argues that empathy is a valuable “way of knowing” that 
can aid judges in appreciating “the human meanings of a given legal situation,” 
and in the processes of reaching decisions and justifying conclusions.36 
 
30 Id. at 41 (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in 
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985)). 
31 Id.  Guinier also notes that Justice Ginsburg issued an impassioned written and oral 
dissent in Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1640 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
Here, too, Ginsburg’s pioneering role in litigating sex-equality cases that challenged 
“archaic” stereotypes about women’s capacities likely informed her critique of the 
majority’s denial of women’s decisional autonomy for a “way of thinking” that “reflects 
ancient notions about women’s place in the family and under the Constitution – ideas that 
have long since been discredited.”  Id. at 1649.  Thus, Guinier observes: “In Carhart, Justice 
Ginsburg showed she well understands how expressive harms that demean women based on 
nineteenth-century stereotypes discourage their active participation in democracy.”  Guinier, 
supra note 5, at 50. 
32 Henderson, supra note 17, at 1576 (observing the tendency “to deny a role to 
empathetic responses in . . . approaches to legal problems” and arguing that allowing such a 
role will lead to improved decision-making). 
33 Id. at 1574.  
34 Id. at 1576. 
35 Id. at 1579. 
36 Id. at 1576. 
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To illustrate, she contends that certain Justices’ empathy for the narratives 
presented to them best explains the decisions in Brown v. Board of Education37 
and Shapiro v. Thompson.38  By contrast, Roe v. Wade39 and its progeny reflect 
a selective empathy, a “failure to hear certain empathic narratives,” while 
Bowers v. Hardwick40 reflects a “complete failure of empathy.”41  There have 
been dramatic changes to the constitutional law landscape in these areas since 
Henderson wrote.  Notably, in contrast to Hardwick’s lack of empathy for 
homosexuals, Lawrence v. Texas, in overruling Hardwick, spoke of the 
“dignity” to which homosexuals were entitled and spoke respectfully of their 
intimate association.42  Nonetheless, Henderson’s plea to look at emotion as a 
component of judging is still timely, as the recent outpouring of scholarship 
about law and emotion suggests.43  Moreover, legal scholars continue to study 
the role of narrative and storytelling in key Supreme Court cases and how 
stories can change the law as well as a society’s self-understanding.44 
It is helpful to situate Guinier’s project of demosprudence through dissent in 
the context of Henderson’s plea and these ongoing strands of legal inquiry.  
But doing so also suggests the new ground opened up by Guinier’s project.  
For example, Henderson illuminates how either the presence or absence of 
empathy shaped various Supreme Court opinions.45  By contrast, Guinier looks 
to biography as a partial explanation for why a particular Justice would choose 
the form of an oral dissent and speak directly to “ordinary citizens.”46  Seeking 
to explain the role of empathy in Brown, Henderson points to the Court’s 
 
37 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
38 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969) (invalidating state laws which required denying welfare 
benefits to new residents for a full year); see Henderson, supra note 17, at 1577 (discussing 
the impact of empathy in Brown and Shapiro). 
39 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
40 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
41 Henderson, supra note 17, at 1577. 
42 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.  Further, Henderson concludes her article with a 
reference to empathy, reminding us of our “common humanity and responsibility to one 
another.”  Henderson, supra note 17, at 1653.  Indeed, in Goodridge v. Department of 
Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
appealed to the “common humanity” of same-sex and opposite-sex couples.  Id. at 955.  
Common humanity or shared human aspirations to marriage are themes in that opinion and 
other state high court opinions receptive to constitutional challenges by same-sex couples to 
state marriage laws, as is the notion that gay men and lesbians are neighbors, not strangers.  
See, e.g., Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 218 (N.J. 2006) (explaining that same-sex couples 
“are our neighbors, our co-workers, and our friends”). 
43 For a helpful introduction to the literature, see generally THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan 
A. Bandes ed., 1999). 
44 See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 110-64 (2000). 
45 Henderson, supra note 17, at 1577, 1649-50 (discussing empathy’s role in Supreme 
Court cases dealing with segregation, poverty, abortion, and homosexuality). 
46 Guinier, supra note 5, at 59. 
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recognition of human emotion in Brown’s famous language regarding how 
racial school segregation creates in black children a “feeling of inferiority as to 
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way 
unlikely ever to be undone.”47  How did the Court come to that understanding?  
In part, through then-attorney Thurgood Marshall’s arguments and the expert 
testimony presented by Dr. Kenneth Clark;48 but the Court’s receptivity to 
these arguments may have had roots in the experiences of particular members 
of the Court.   Thus, Henderson recounts how Justice Frankfurter struggled to 
reconcile his commitment to legality – his view of the proper constitutional 
result – with his conviction that segregation was repugnant.49  Henderson 
recounts Frankfurter’s experience as a Jew who had only partially succeeded at 
assimilating and posits that as “a member of a group subjected to the worst 
forms of racism, prejudice, and torture throughout history . . . [t]he pain of the 
experience of being Jewish could not help but resonate even if only slightly to 
the pain of another oppressed minority.”50  Frankfurter had also been advisory 
counsel to the NAACP.51  Biographer H.N. Hirsch further suggests that 
Frankfurter’s willingness to go along with the Court’s decision may have 
stemmed from “the personal value [he] attached to the importance of public 
schools as a means of integration into American society.”52 
A common aspect of both Henderson’s and Guinier’s projects is the 
emphasis on taking action.53  The third element of empathy, noted above, is 
“action brought about by experiencing the distress of another.”54  Empathy is a 
 
47 Henderson, supra note 17, at 1594 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 
(1954)). 
48 See id. at 1596-1603 (discussing Thurgood Marshall’s arguments in Brown and the 
role played by Dr. Kenneth Clark’s expert testimony on the social science research).  
Henderson notes that some members of the Court were not persuaded by this resort to social 
science.  Id. at 1603-04 (examining the responses of Justices Jackson and Frankfurter to the 
sociological narrative used by the NAACP).  It lies beyond the scope of this Essay to 
discuss the subsequent debates about this strategy and controversy over Dr. Clark’s 
testimony.  But for a sampling of that debate, see, for example, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 264-65 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (deriding the majority’s heavy reliance on 
one-sided social science evidence when other social science evidence shows different 
conclusions); Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 153-54 (1955) 
(considering the dilemma of using “the Brandeis brief, filled with sociological and 
economic data for the judges’ information” to overturn legislation). 
49 See Henderson, supra note 17, at 1604-05. 
50 Id. at 1604. 
51 See id. 
52 H.N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 195 n.* (1981). 
53 See Guinier, supra note 5, at 50 (“[D]emosprudential dissents summon the public – 
through their representatives or their own marching feet – to act in the name of 
democracy.”); Henderson, supra note 17, at 1579. 
54 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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way of knowing that is a “catalyst for action.”55  The relevant action, in 
Henderson’s analysis, is reaching a legal conclusion that will address the harm 
that another is suffering, whether ordering the desegregation of schools or, as 
in Shapiro v. Thompson, affording poor people their constitutional right to 
travel to another state to be with family or to improve their lot.56  The third 
element of Guinier’s definition of a demosprudential dissent is “facilitative,” 
or, in effect, catalytic.57  Guinier explains: “[T]he dissenting opinion speaks to 
non-judicial actors, whether legislators, local thought leaders, or ordinary 
people, and encourages them to step in or step up to revisit the majority’s 
conclusions.”58  While Henderson introduces greater attention to empathy to 
encourage better judging and opinions informed by appreciation for “our 
common humanity,”59 Guinier urges dissenting Justices to view their dissents 
as an opportunity to expand the arena of democratic action and 
accountability.60  Guinier, in her concluding pages, turns to majority opinions 
as a form of demosprudence.61  Although legal academics criticized Brown for 
its lack of “well-developed legal reasoning,” they fail to see its 
“demosprudential quality”; its very “accessibility and forcefulness were the 
inspiration for a social movement that gave the opinion its legs.”62 
In this brief Essay, I cannot offer a thorough discussion of the costs and 
benefits of Guinier’s demosprudential dissent strategy.  This may be due in 
part to the temptation to bring a results-oriented approach to assessing such 
dissents.  Thus, because I disagree with the Ledbetter ruling, I like that Justice 
Ginsburg’s oral dissent spurred Lily Ledbetter and Congress to take up the 
cause of “fixing” the Court’s ruling through legislative change.63  Indeed, 
Congress has already taken action, endorsed first by President Obama as a 
 
55 See Henderson, supra note 17, at 1579.  
56 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (“An indigent who desires to migrate, 
resettle, find a new job, and start a new life will doubtless hesitate if he knows that he must 
risk making the move without the possibility of falling back on state welfare assistance.”); 
see also Henderson, supra note 17, at 1615-17 (describing the majority opinion in Shapiro 
as focused on the individual indigents whose constitutional right to travel had been impeded 
by the states’ one-year residency requirement for welfare benefits). 
57 Guinier, supra note 5, at 48.  The other two elements are (1) “on a substantive level, 
the dissent probes or tests a particular understanding of democracy,” and (2) “its style likely 
deviates from the conventional point-by-point refutation of the majority’s logical flaws,” 
and instead “may tell a good ‘public story,’ built upon shared experiences and common 
concerns” or use other dramatic methods.  Id. at 47-48. 
58 Id. at 48. 
59 Henderson, supra note 17, at 1653. 
60 Guinier, supra note 5, at 131 (urging that “[t]he time is ripe . . . for the Court to see 
beyond academics to the people themselves as a source of democratic authority and 
accountability”). 
61 See id. at 130-31. 
62 Id. at 131. 
63 Id. at 41. 
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Senator and candidate, and subsequently, as President, when he signed the 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.64  By contrast, because I agree with the result 
reached by the majority in Lawrence and also support opening up civil 
marriage to same-sex couples, I dislike Justice Scalia’s warning to “ordinary 
people” – “[d]o not believe it” (that is, the majority’s disclaimer that the case 
does not involve formally recognizing homosexual relationships) – when he 
contends that soon the nation will have same-sex marriage foisted upon it by 
the federal judiciary and that the majority signals the death knell of all 
“morals” legislation.65  I dislike it both as a misreading of Lawrence, but also 
because there is reason to believe that his dissent did catalyze opponents of 
same-sex marriage to renew efforts to pass state “defense of marriage” laws 
and amend state constitutions to forbid same-sex couples from marrying, as 
well as to amend the U.S. Constitution to bar such marriages.66 
Putting this results-oriented reaction aside, I am drawn to Guinier’s 
emphasis on the educative role of Supreme Court opinions generally, of 
dissents in particular, and of her call for an expanded sphere of democratic 
action.67  Finally, her examination of how biography may shape judicial 
decision-making68 is a timely one as a new President faces the prospect of 
making a number of judicial nominations.  To return to Henderson, how 
biography shapes the capacity for empathy may well prove an important theme 
in that process.69 
II. PRESIDENT OBAMA, EMPATHY, AND JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 
Shortly before the 2008 presidential election, Professor Steven Calabresi, in 
an editorial in the Wall Street Journal, drew attention to then-candidate Barack 
Obama’s statement about how he would select judges: 
[W]e need somebody who’s got the heart, the empathy, to recognize what 
it’s like to be a young teenage mom.  The empathy to understand what it’s 
 
64 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (to be codified at 
42 U.S.C. §2000a).  For President Obama’s remarks on signing this bill, see Remarks on 
Signing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. No. 33 (Jan. 29, 
2009) [hereinafter Remarks on Signing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act]. 
65 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599-605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
66 See Guinier, supra note 5, at 98 (describing the response to Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
Lawrence).  Having criticized Scalia’s dissent in part for its catalytic effect, I should 
acknowledge that the majority opinion itself offended some proponents of traditional 
marriage and of a proper state role in using the criminal law to instill moral values; they 
probably did not need Justice Scalia’s opinion to motivate them.  It is also likely that even 
without Justice Ginsburg’s exhortation, those committed to pay equity for women would 
likely have acted to rectify the Court’s ruling. 
67 Id. at 134 (“In this tradition, Justices teach the public to identify with the constitutional 
values at stake and invite them to speak back in a voice that is all their own.”). 
68 See id. at 32-45. 
69 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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like to be poor, or African-American, or gay, or disabled, or old.  And 
that’s the criteria by which I’m going to be selecting my judges.70 
Calabresi warned that this means “[e]mpathy, not justice, ought to be the 
mission of the federal courts, and the redistribution of wealth should be their 
mantra” – a dangerous departure from the traditional image of justice, or 
Justitia, as blind-folded.71  This recent editorial suggests the continuing 
relevance of a perceived dichotomy between legality and empathy.72  Calabresi 
expresses the contrast as between justice and empathy: “To the traditional view 
of justice as a blindfolded person weighing legal claims fairly on a scale, 
[Obama] wants to tear the blindfold off, so the judge can rule for the party he 
empathizes with most.”73  Calabresi warns that “[n]othing less than the very 
idea of liberty and the rule of law are at stake in this election,” concluding that 
“[w]e should not let Mr. Obama replace justice with empathy in our nation’s 
courtrooms.”74 
Now that Senator Obama is President Obama, we will have the opportunity 
to learn more about his understanding of empathy and, presumably, his critics’ 
fears of the antithesis between justice and empathy.  Why does President 
Obama believe empathy is important to judging and how does he think it 
should shape judicial reasoning?  Some answers appear in his remarks about 
why he voted against confirming John Roberts as Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court.75  Then-Senator Obama explained that he was “sorely tempted to vote 
for Judge Roberts” based on, among other things, his conversations with then-
Judge Roberts, Roberts’s resume, comportment, temperament, humility, 
personal decency, and love for the law.76  Moreover, he believed that Judge 
Roberts had deep respect for the “basic precepts that go into deciding 95 
percent of the cases that come before the Federal court – adherence to 
precedence [sic], a certain modesty in reading statutes and constitutional text, a 
respect for procedural regularity, and an impartiality in presiding over the 
 
70 Calabresi, supra note 18 (emphasis added) (quoting Senator Barack Obama, Speech to 
the Planned Parenthood Action Fund (July 17, 2007), available at 
http://lauraetch.googlepages.com/barackobamabeforeplannedparenthoodaction. 
71 Id.  Although I am not taking up here Calabresi’s attack on redistribution, Sotirios A. 
Barber (a contributor to this symposium), in a letter to the Wall Street Journal, pointed out 
the problems with Calabresi’s dichotomy: courts have a role in ensuring that government 
fulfill its object of securing the “general Welfare, and . . . the Blessings of Liberty.”  Sotirios 
A. Barber, Letter to the Editor, Any Big Change to the Courts Will Take a Long Time, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 7, 2008, at A16 (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.). 
72 See Calabresi, supra note 18. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 See 151 CONG. REC. S10,365-66 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2005). 
76 Id. at S10,366 (statement of Sen. Obama).  
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adversarial system.”77  The problem, Obama explained, was the other five 
percent of cases: 
The problem I face . . . is that while adherence to legal precedent and 
rules of statutory or constitutional construction will dispose of 95 percent 
of the cases that come before a court, so that both a Scalia and a Ginsburg 
will arrive at the same place most of the time on those 95 percent of the 
cases – what matters on the Supreme Court is those 5 percent of cases that 
are truly difficult.  In those cases, adherence to precedent and rules of 
construction and interpretation will only get you through the 25th mile of 
the marathon.  That last mile can only be determined on the basis of one’s 
deepest values, one’s core concerns, one’s broader perspectives on how 
the world works, and the depth and breadth of one’s empathy.78 
Thus, Obama explicitly identifies empathy as an important personal quality 
that is not antagonistic to justice, but is an important supplement when “rule of 
law” values alone do not supply an answer.79  In “hard cases,” he continues, 
where constitutional text is not “directly on point,” and statutory language not 
perfectly clear, “the critical ingredient is supplied by what is in the judge’s 
heart.”80  Specific case examples Obama provides are whether a right of 
privacy encompasses a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy or whether a 
person with disabilities has a right to accommodation so that “they can work 
alongside those who are nondisabled.”81  He notes that in their conversations, 
Judge Roberts said it was “not easy for him to talk about his values and his 
deeper feelings,” but that “he doesn’t like bullies and has always viewed the 
law as a way of evening out the playing field between the strong and the 
weak.”82  Senator Obama, while “impressed with that statement” because it 
mirrored his own view of law, found Judge Roberts’s record to the contrary: 
“[I]t is my personal estimation that he has far more often used his formidable 
skills on behalf of the strong in opposition to the weak,” for example, siding 
with “those who were dismissive of efforts to eradicate the remnants of racial 
discrimination in our political process” and of those who dismiss “the concerns 
that it is harder to make it in this world and in this economy when you are a 
woman rather than a man.”83  Obama concluded that because he had to “give 
more weight to his deeds” than his words, he must vote against Judge Roberts, 
although he hoped that Judge Roberts would prove to have a 
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Obama’s remarks opposing the confirmation of Samuel Alito to the 
Supreme Court and Janice Rogers Brown to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
reiterate his concerns about appointing a judge who consistently sides with the 
powerful over the powerless.85  Does this concern evidence a disregard for 
justice or the rule of law?  To the contrary, Obama appeals to the idea – voiced 
by Roberts – that the law should afford a chance to even an unequal playing 
field.86  To return to the speech Calabresi criticized, Obama related the need 
for “heart” or “empathy” to the need for judges to be able to understand the 
experience of being part of a marginalized or disadvantaged group.87  Calabresi 
correctly observes that Obama’s vision is not a model of judicial blindness.88  
However, removing the blindfold does not suggest an abandonment of the rule 
of law or justice.  As a burgeoning literature on the image of Justitia suggests, 
the very isolation of Justitia from the litigants before her may contribute to a 
failure to secure justice.89  Thus, feminist, Critical Race, and other legal 
scholars invite reflection on whether removing the blindfold might be an 
appropriate updating of Justitia which would allow for a useful transcending of 
overly sharp dichotomies between justice and care, legality and empathy, or 
even judgment and mercy.90  President Obama’s election squarely puts the 
issue of the qualities sought in adjudication and the role of judges on the table 
in perhaps new and fruitful ways.  We may also see more embodiment of 
 
85 See 152 CONG. REC. S190 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 2006) (statement of Sen. Obama) 
(“[W]hen I examine the philosophy, ideology, and record of Samuel Alito, I’m deeply 
troubled.”).  In opposing Janice Rogers Brown’s nomination to the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals, Obama referred to her as a “political activist who happens to be a judge,” who 
used her position on the bench to further “social Darwinism, a view of America that says 
there is not a problem that cannot be solved by making sure that the rich get richer and the 
poor get poorer.”  151 CONG. REC. S6178 (daily ed. June 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. 
Obama). 
86 See 151 CONG. REC. S10,366 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2005) (statement of Sen. Obama).  
87 See Calabresi, supra note 18. 
88 See id. 
89 See, e.g., ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 27-60 (1997) (discussing the limitations of 
viewing justice as blindfolded in order to be impartial and universal). 
90 For feminist critiques, see id. at 50, 51-52 (arguing for the integration of care and 
justice and a relational ethic on which judges should recognize the “particular claims of the 
particular litigants on the court’s legal and moral imagination and resources”); Judith Resnik 
& Dennis E. Curtis, Representing Justice: From Renaissance Iconography to Twenty-First-
Century Courthouses, 151 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 139, 160-64 (2007) (discussing the 
meaning of the blindfold on the image of Justice from a historical perspective); see also 
Judith Resnik, Reconstructing Equality: Of Justice, Justicia, and the Gender of Jurisdiction, 
14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 393, 396, 419 (2002) (discussing the “irony of the longstanding 
association of the female body with Justice,” given historic forms of sex inequality and 
contemporary failures to prevent violence against women).  For a Critical Race Theory 
perspective, see Bennett Capers, On Justitia, Race, Gender, and Blindness, 12 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 203, 206-07 (2006) (questioning the blindness of Justice when race plays such an 
important role in society).  
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Justice Thurgood Marshall’s ideal of judges understanding “how people 
live.”91 
III. THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN SPURRING SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION 
My third comment on Professor Guinier’s article concerns the relationship 
between her project and the broader issue of “the constitution outside the 
courts,” that is, the idea that courts alone cannot – and should not – bring about 
the full realization of constitutional ideals.92  The literature on this topic is too 
vast to engage in any detail in this brief Essay, but I will focus on one recent 
contribution by political scientist Rogers Smith.93  Guinier contemplates 
demosprudential dissents as appropriate catalysts when the dissenter believes 
the majority is wrong and seeks to educate and mobilize the public either to 
have a critical discourse about the law or to make efforts to bring about law 
reform.94  In contrast, Smith posits that courts necessarily have a relatively 
limited role to play in bringing about the fundamental structural institutional 
change that is needed to bring about full, equal citizenship – substantive 
equality – for minorities and for women.95  He refers to the marginality of the 
Supreme Court because “the most important tasks in restructuring American 
institutions to remove barriers to meaningfully equal citizenship for women 
and men now go far beyond the capacities and the legitimate authority of the 
judiciary when engaged in constitutional interpretation.”96  For example, laws 
explicitly disadvantaging women are rare and “women have far greater formal 
opportunities than in the past”; however, “overall public policies and social 
practices still structure the lives of most women so that they carry 
disproportionate responsibilities for family and household care and face greater 
difficulties acquiring economic resources.”97  Compounding this with other 
factors like sexual harassment in the workplace, welfare policies affecting low-
income women, and continuing bias in criminal justice systems, leads to the 
result that “overall, women do not really have meaningfully equal chances to 
gain and exercise political influence, or to have ‘full citizenship stature . . . 
[defined by Justice Ginsburg as] equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, 
participate in and contribute to society based on their individual talents and 
capacities.’”98 
 
91 United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 460 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
92 See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 181-82 
(1999) (defining “populist constitutional law” as “treat[ing] constitutional law not as 
something in the hands of lawyers and judges but in the hands of the people themselves”). 
93 Smith, supra note 19. 
94 See Guinier, supra note 5.  
95 See Smith, supra note 19 (manuscript at 4). 
96 Id. (manuscript at 18). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. (manuscript at 19) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996)). 
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What can courts, and the Supreme Court in particular, do to bring about the 
structural transformation needed to secure equal citizenship?  While Smith 
cautions against looking to the Court for such structural change, he argues that 
it can – and should – play a helpful, perhaps catalytic role by pointing out the 
need for such transformation: 
The courts do have a constitutional duty to pursue gender equality and 
civic equality to the very margins of their institutional competence.  Even 
when it would be wrong for them to devise and mandate sweeping 
remedies, they should scrutinize more closely public policies and 
institutional arrangements that foster conditions in which women do not 
on balance have equal practical opportunities to be politically active 
citizens.  Their rulings can then help highlight the most important tasks of 
civic restructuring that confront the rest of us.99 
For example, Smith applauds the Court’s decision in Nevada Department of 
Human Resources v. Hibbs100 for upholding a private right of action under the 
Family and Medical Leave Act.101  At the same time, he faults Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s majority opinion for not linking work/family conflict – and the 
continuing problem of how mutually reinforcing stereotypes about women and 
men hinder their ability to be parents and workers – to women’s equal 
citizenship.102 
CONCLUSION: PURSUING JUSTICE IN EVERYDAY LIFE 
Professor Guinier’s invitation to consider the potential of Supreme Court 
dissents to spur “ordinary people” to action encourages her readers in the legal 
academy to reflect on the role of courts in catalyzing citizens to engage in 
social and constitutional change.  Her specific examples of Lilly Ledbetter and 
Pat Todd suggest that sometimes an impassioned oral dissent can strike a 
resonant chord with a listener who, like the dissenter, believes the Court has 
failed to do justice and uphold constitutional values in the case before it.  It 
seems a propitious time, with the election of President Obama, to consider the 
potential for such oral dissents.  As noted above, President Obama identifies 
empathy and the ability to appreciate the stories of the lives of the 
marginalized and the powerless as an important judicial quality. 
But beyond the executive’s role in the judicial appointment process, the 
executive may also play a role in inspiring activism.  After all, the Obama 
campaign and the Democratic Convention made much of Lilly Ledbetter’s 
 
99 Id. (manuscript at 4-5). 
100 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
101 Id. at 724-25; see Smith, supra note 19 (manuscript at 3). 
102 Smith, supra note 19 (manuscript at 4) (“[T]he problem[] presented [in Hibbs] [was a] 
crucial one[] for the well-being of women.  But none of the Justices who wrote opinions 
gave any substantial, explicit attention to issues of gender and equal constitutional 
citizenship.”). 
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fight for justice.103  Obama often links such struggles to a quest to honor core 
American principles.  Thus, upon signing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay 
Restoration Act, President Obama described her as deciding “that there was a 
principle at stake, something worth fighting for,” noting that her long journey 
culminated in a law “which will help others get the justice that she was 
denied.”104  First Lady Michelle Obama described “Lilly’s story and the 
broader issue of equal pay” as a concern “voiced over and over and over” 
during the campaign; at the signing, she praised Ledbetter as  an “extraordinary 
woman” who “knew unfairness when she saw it, and was willing to do 
something about it because it was the right thing to do.”105  At the signing of 
the Act, Ledbetter herself said that even though she would “never see a cent 
from my case,” her “richer reward” is that “my daughters and granddaughters, 
and your daughters and granddaughters, will have a better deal.”106  In lofty 
rhetoric, President Obama’s signing statement linked the specific legislation to 
a vindication of fundamental national principles: “It is fitting that the very first 
bill that I sign . . . is upholding one of this nation’s founding principles: that we 
are all created equal and each deserve a chance to pursue our own version of 
happiness.”107  Moreover, his populist rhetoric links justice to everyday life: 
“Justice isn’t about some abstract legal theory, or footnote in a casebook.  It’s 
about how our laws affect the daily lives and the daily realities of people: their 
ability to make a living and care for their families and achieve their goals.”108 
The political theater of President Obama signing the bill while surrounded 
by Ledbetter, First Lady Michelle Obama, and female lawmakers all adorned 
in a bold blaze of red (the color of pay equity) was inspired and inspiring.109  
Moreover, his praise of Ledbetter and of other “advocates” who worked hard 
to “stand[] for what’s right” may itself inspire further social activism, as 
ordinary people see what can result from such efforts.110  Thus, even as 
Professor Guinier invites the Court to open up new possibilities of democratic 
 
103 Ledbetter spoke at the Democratic Convention, see Lilly Ledbetter, Address to the 
Democratic National Convention (Aug. 26, 2008), http://www.demconvention.com/lily-
ledbetter/, and Obama pledged during his campaign to sign a law to overturn the Court’s 
decision.  See CHANGE WE CAN BELIEVE IN: BARACK OBAMA’S PLAN TO RENEW AMERICA’S 
PROMISE 165 (2008) (“As President, Barack Obama  will . . . [s]ign into law the Fair Pay 
Restoration Act that Barack Obama co-introduced to overturn last year’s Supreme Court 
decision that made it harder for women to file pay-discrimination claims after they become 
victims of discriminatory compensation.”); Robert Pear, Justices’ Ruling in Discrimination 
Case May Draw Quick Action by Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2009, at A13. 
104 Remarks on Signing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, supra note 64, at 1. 
105 The White House Blog, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog_post/AWonderfulDay/ (Jan. 
29, 2009, 12:00 EST). 
106 Id. 
107 Remarks on Signing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, supra note 64, at 1. 
108 Id. 
109 See The White House Blog, supra note 105. 
110 Remarks on Signing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, supra note 64, at 2. 
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engagement through demosprudential dissent, it is worth directing attention to 
the potential of the executive, in this “new era of responsibility,”111 to serve as 
an even more powerful catalyst to democratic engagement and vindication of 
core constitutional principles and national values.  
 
 
111 Inaugural Address, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. No 1, at 4 (Jan. 20, 2009). 
